Introduction
Maritime piracy is not a new phenomena. It has been known since at least the ancient times, when Cicero described them as hostes humani generis -enemies of all peoples 1 . However, the recent surge in piracy attacks, especially off the coast of Somalia, has made the international community to refocus its attention on this problem. This, in turn, has led to intensified efforts of States, individually and under the auspices of international organisations, to combat piracy. It is therefore interesting to analyse as to how far the existing international law framework provides the necessary tools for that combat. This will be the aim of this paper.
In order to present challenges that piracy, arguably, poses to the modern international law, it is firstly necessary to show what are the existing norms of international law governing piracy. This will be done in symposium on Maritime Piracy in International law two steps. Initially, the focus will be put on the law of the sea, notably on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS" or "the Convention") 2 .
Afterwards, it will turn to other (than, strictly understood, law of the sea) fields of international law. In the second part of this paper, an attempt will be made to characterize selected challenges modern piracy creates from the viewpoint of international law. The following challenges that relate to the very definition of piracy were chosen in this respect: (a) the problem of "piracy" being committed "for private ends" and the possibility to qualify terrorist acts as piratical; (b) the territorial scope of piracy; and (c) the so called "two ships criterion" in the definition of piracy.
International law framework -rules governing Piracy

codification of the international law of the sea concerning piracy
The aim of this part of the analysis is to provide a brief overview of the creation of the law of the sea rules on piracy. Although it takes historical perspective, the main accent is put on UNCLOS and its provisions. Other legal endeavours are characterized for background purposes.
work within the league of nations
First attempts to codify and/or develop international law of the sea were made under the auspices of the League of Nations 3 . In 1924 the Council of the League of Nations appointed members of the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law. The Committee of Experts, at its First Session (Geneva, 1-8.4.1925), adopted a list of subjects for preliminary examination -piracy among them -and appointed eleven sub-committees to report to the Committee on these subjects 4 . One year later the Committee transmitted questionnaires to the Governments (asking "their opinion upon the question whether the regulation by international agreement of the subjects treated, both in their general aspects and as regards the specific points mentioned in the questionnaires, is desirable and realizable in the future") and, inter alia, the one on piracy included also a report on the subject and a preliminary draft of a convention 5 . The questionnaire on piracy received mixed answers as to the desirability of drafting a convention on that matter: nine Governments replied affirmatively; nine Governments replied affirmatively but with reservations; three Governments though not opposed found the question of no urgency and of limited interest; six Governments refrained from expressing any opinion and two Governments did not think the conclusion of a convention to be either possible or desirable 6 . On that basis, the Committee prepared a Report that was submitted to the Council in 1927. The Report suggested that 5 topics (nationality, territorial waters, diplomatic immunities and privileges, responsibility of states, and piracy) were ripe for codification at a diplomatic conference. However, realizing that States attach unequal importance to those topics, the Committee proposed to exclude the subjects of piracy and possibly of diplomatic immunities from the conference 5 Ibidem, at p. 69. 6 Ibidem, at p. 71. Among States opposed to the draft convention on piracy were United States of America. As reported by J.S. Reeves, Progress of the Work of the League of Nations Codification Committee, 'American Journal of International Law' 1927, Vol. 21, No. 4, at p. 665: "With regard to the sixth subject enumerated in the communication of the Secretary-General, namely, Piracy, it is the view of the Government of the United States that piracy, as that term is known in international law, is so nearly extinct as to render of little importance consideration of that subject as one to be regulated by international agreement" (emphasis added). 7 United Nations Documents on the Development and Codification of International Law, op. cit., at pp. 74-75. In the words of the Polish Representative, Mr. M. Zaleski: "It is perhaps doubtful whether the question of Piracy is of sufficient real interest in the present state of the world to justify its inclusion in the programme of the conference, if the scope of the conference ought to be cut down. The subject is in any case not one the League's Assembly adopted the resolution calling for convening a First Codification Conference in 1929, possibly in The Hague, to consider the issues of: nationality, territorial waters and responsibility of states 8 . Ultimately, the Conference was held in The Hague from 13.3.1930 to 12.4.1930. Notwithstanding its results, from the perspective of the present paper it is important to underline that the topic of piracy was not considered at the conference. Also, the work on the subject of piracy did not progress further within the League of Nations.
harvard research in International law draft on Piracy
The list of topics that was identified by the League of Nations' Committee of Experts inspired also a non-governmental response. Namely, at the initiative of Harvard Law School, Research in International Law was established that undertook an effort to prepare a scientific study, initially on topics pinpointed by the Committee. This led to the adoption in 1932, under the chairmanship of J. W. Bingham, of a draft Convention on Piracy (consisting of 19 articles) with commentaries ("Harvard Draft") 9 . This draft involved in particular the definition of piracy and pirate ship (Articles 3 and 4), as well as differentiation between rights of States towards a pirate ship depending whether it was found in areas within or outside national jurisdiction (Articles 6 and 7), and elaborated on rights of States with regard to the captured pirates, asserting that a State may prosecute and punish that person, however under certain conditions also provided for in that provision (Article 14). Interestingly, it also provided for the so called "reverse hot pursuit" (Article 7(1)), that is a pursuit for a pirate ship that started in areas beyond national jurisdiction and that can be continued into or over the territorial sea of another State, where the seizure may be made.
of vital interest for every State, or one the treatment of which can be regarded as in any way urgent, and the replies of certain Governments with regard to it indicate that there are difficulties in the way of concluding a universal agreement". Although the Harvard Draft was of a private character, it has influenced international law, in particular the International Law Commission (ILC) when it dealt with its draft on the Articles on the Law of the Sea that, in turn, constituted basis for the four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea adopted in 1958.
2.1.3. Ilc draft articles and 1958 geneva conventions on the law of the sea Already at its first session in 1949, the ILC identified in the provisional list of topics whose codification it considered necessary and feasible, inter alia, the following: the régime of the high seas and the régime of the territorial sea. J.P.A. François was appointed as a Special Rapporteur for both of the topics. The ILC concluded its work in 1956 adopting Articles concerning the law of the sea with commentaries ("ILC Draft") 10 . They involved in particular a set of rules concerning piracy (Articles 38-45). The ILC Draft constituted a basis for the work of the diplomatic conference convened in Geneva in 1958. Four separate conventions were adopted at the conference on 29. For the purposes of the present paper, of particular importance is CHS which, in Articles 14-21, involves provisions on piracy. It is worthwhile to note that, except minor editorial and/or linguistic modifications, the Convention follows closely the ILC Draft in that respect.
Moreover, it shall be underlined that CHS provisions on piracy were adopted, in most cases without substantial discussion, also at the III UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1982. For this reason, the 10 Therefore, at least when it comes to Articles 100-107 of UNCLOS (that is the ones dealing with piracy), it can be asserted that the Convention reflects customary international law 20 . As such, these norms bind all States, notwithstanding the fact whether they expressed their will to be bound by the Convention.
UNCLOS provisions on piracy can be grouped into three subsets of rules. The first one relates to "the who" -that is the definitions of "piracy" (Article 101 UNCLOS 21 Article 101 UNCLOS: "Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)."
ILC Draft) 22 , as well as the provision assimilating piracy committed by a warship or government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship to acts committed by private ship or aircraft (Article 102 UNCLOS; Article 16 CHS; Article 40 ILC Draft), and the provision specifying that a ship or aircraft may retain its nationality -subject to the national law of flag State -although it has become a piratical one (Article 104 UNCLOS; Article 18 CHS; Article 42 ILC Draft).
When it comes to the definition of "piracy" it shall be underlined at this stage of analysis that it is restricted to acts committed at high seas and that it contains a "two ships criterion" -piratical act has to be committed "against another ship" to be properly defined as "piracy". Therefore, acts of individuals against their own ship do not fulfil that definition.
The second set of UNCLOS rules on piracy consists of provisions dealing with "the what" -specifying what rights and obligations other States have towards pirates. Namely, "[a]ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State" (Article 100 UNCLOS; Article 14 CHS; Article 38 ILC Draft). Also, in the above mentioned areas, "every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board". Additionally, the courts of the seizing State "may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith" (Article 105 UNCLOS; Article 19 CHS; Article 43 ILC Draft). One could add to this group of the Convention's provisions the one dealing with the right of visit 23 -that is the right of a warship to board foreign ship when there is a reasonable ground for suspecting that the latter is engaged in piracy (Article 110 UNCLOS; Article 22 CHS; Article 46 ILC Draft). 22 Article 103 UNCLOS: "A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in Article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act". 23 Right of visit is not traditionally discussed in the context of piracy, however it seems to be relevant in the present context insofar it establishes the right of warships to board vessels they suspect of piracy.
Finally, the third set of UNCLOS provisions establishes "the how" -specifying that these are only warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect, that can seize a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy (Article 107 UNCLOS; Article 21 CHS; Article 45 ILC Draft). This provision is supplemented by Article 106 UNCLOS (Article 20 CHS; Article 44 ILC Draft) where it is stated that:
here the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure".
Although UNCLOS provisions with regard to piracy seem, prima facie, to be relatively comprehensive and exhaustive, they nevertheless pose some legal and practical problems. Those related with the first set of UNCLOS rules concerning piracy will be further elaborated on in the third part of this paper.
outside the framework of the International law of the sea
Even though UNCLOS is considered as the main treaty when it comes to the law of the sea in general, and piracy in particular, it is worthwhile to look into some other international agreements, both of universal and regional character, that could have a role to play with respect to piracy. of offences listed in its Article 3(1). Among them are the following: (a) seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; (b) performing an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or (c) destroying a ship or causing damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship. Putting jurisdictional scope of the SUA Convention (defined in its Article 4) aside for the moment, the characterization of above-listed offences seems to be broad enough (especially the one in Article 3(1)(a)), to cover many instances of what could also be termed as "piracy" for the purposes of Article 101 UNCLOS. As D. Guilfoyle put it "[t]his broad offence would not cover the petty-theft smash-and-grab type of piracy common in South East Asian waters, but it certainly appears to fit the Somali variety" 25 . Moreover, unlike Article 101 UNCLOS, SUA Convention does not require that the crime is committed by one ship against another. One could add here that that was an intentional attempt by the proponent of this convention, since it was negotiated after the Achille Lauro incident (described below) took place, and that showed the inapplicability of piracy as defined in UNCLOS to, inter alia, crimes committed by the passengers of a ship against that very ship. Also, the crimes under SUA Convention does not have to be committed "for private ends" which is yet another requirement under Article 101 UNCLOS and will be discussed below.
Another interesting feature of the SUA Convention is its territorial scope of application. As specified in Article 4: "This Convention applies if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States".
And even if this condition is not met, SUA Convention would nevertheless apply by virtue of its Article 4(2) that extends its scope to situations where: "[t]he offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of State Party other than the State referred to in paragraph 1".
Clearly, in accordance with Article 4(1), SUA Convention will apply as long as the crime is not (intended to be) committed by (from) a ship within the territorial sea of one State. This is much broader formulation than the one in Article 101 UNCLOS. Most notably, it does not have to take place in the high seas.
Lastly, the SUA Convention obliges States to establish jurisdiction in relation to crimes enlisted in Article 3 when one of the jurisdictional links provided for in Article 6(1) is fulfilled 26 . This provision is supplemented by Article 10 which says that a State in the territory of which the offender or alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, submit him for prosecution 27 . Reassuming, one can point out that SUA Convention's definition is different to the one in UNCLOS in three main points: (a) the two ships criterion was omitted; (b) there is no requirement that a crime is committed for private ends; (c) it does not necessarily have to take place in the high seas (or EEZ). Hence, the jurisdictional scope of application of the SUA Convention is broader than of UNCLOS. Even if the former does not relate to "piracy" as such, it will be possible to apply it to cases that at the same time constitute piracy under UNCLOS and, moreover, to instances of "piracy-like crimes" that may not be defined as "piracy" proper due to the limitations inherent in Article 101 UNCLOS.
un hostages convention
Another legal instrument of potential application with regard to piracy is the 1979 International Convention against taking of hostages ("UN Hostages Convention") 28 . It specifies in its Article 1(1): 26 That is when the offence is committed: (a) against or on board a ship flying the flag of that State at the time the offence is committed; or (b) in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea; or (c) by a national of that State. 27 The extent to which this obligation may be properly termed as an obligation of 'aut dedere aut judicare' is omitted here. See for example: ILC, Preliminary report on the obligation to extradite or prosecute ("aut dedere aut judicare"), A/CN.4/57 of 7.6.2006, at paras 37-38. 28 UNTS, Vol. 1316, at p. 205. This Convention entered into force on 3.6.1983 and has presently 169 parties.
"Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("hostage-taking") within the meaning of this Convention" (emphasis added).
It is not uncommon that pirates, especially off the coast of Somalia, kidnap vessels and take the whole crew hostage. Thus, these actions indeed fulfill the above quoted definition as pirates compel States to pay ransom in return for releasing the hostages. It is worthwhile to note in this context, that also UN Security Council resolutions, as well as the Institute of International Law
29
, recognize the applicability of the UN Hostage Convention in the Somali context.
regional agreements: recaaP
With regard to regional agreements, it is necessary to highlight the 2004 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 30 . Apart from the fact that the Agreement is reported to be successful in limiting the number of piratical attacks in the region, it contains certain interesting legal solutions. First, it is important to note that ReCAAP (Article 1(1)) repeats the definition of "piracy" from Article 101 UNCLOS. It also contains important safeguard clause wherein it states that nothing in ReCAAP "shall affect the rights and obligations of any Contracting Party under the international agreements, including the UNCLOS, and the relevant rules of international law". In doing so, the parties to ReCAAP gave priority to their obligations deriving from UNCLOS 31 If they are parties to UNCLOS. Out of the present parties to Regional Cooperation Agreement, only Cambodia is not a party to UNCLOS (although it signed UNCLOS). two important aspects: (a) it contains the definition of "armed robbery" (Article 1(1)) which is not used in the UNCLOS context, however is referred to (though not legally defined) in the framework of International Maritime Organization (IMO) 32 . This definition is based on the one of "piracy" though derives from it insofar as it speaks of acts committed in a place within Contracting Party's jurisdiction and it does not contain the "two ships criterion"; (b) the ReCAAP provides for the obligation to "prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships", "arrest pirates or persons who have committed armed robbery against ships", as well as to "seize ships or aircraft used for committing piracy or armed robbery against ships […]" and to "rescue victim ships and victims of piracy or armed robbery against ships" (Article 3). This set of duties is much broader than one established under the Convention, as the latter obliges States "only" to cooperate (Article 100 UNCLOS) whereas that obligation does not extend to preventing or suppressing piracy, or arresting pirates etc. One could also highlight that the cooperation of States on the basis of ReCAAP was institutionalized, since on its basis an Information Sharing Centre was created.
somali context: united nations security council resolutions
The overview of legal instruments pertaining to piracy would not be complete without referring to the United Nations Security Council resolutions dealing with the piracy off the coast of Somalia. As it is apparent, these resolutions do not apply to piracy in general but only to particular instance of piracy off Somali coasts. Nevertheless, it seems important to characterize some of their main features.
Firstly, it should be underlined that up to date, over a period of roughly four years, the UN Security Council has issued eleven resolutions relating to the above mentioned situation Secondly, all of them highlight the fundamental role of UNCLOS with respect to, notably, piracy. To cite the most recent example:
"Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 ("The Convention"), sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities" 34 (emphasis in original).
However, they also refer to other treaties, in particular to SUA and UN Hostages Conventions 35 . This reaffirms the applicability of these Conventions to, at least some, instances of Somali piracy.
Thirdly, all of these Security Council resolutions speak jointly of "piracy and armed robbery". Security Council does not define the latter phrase for its purposes. However, as it was mentioned before, the latter phrase is usually understood as acts piratical in nature that are committed within the territorial sea and therefore do not fall into the definition of "piracy" contained in Article 101 UNCLOS. The usage by the UN Security Council of this phrase is justified precisely by the fact that some of Somali "piracy" takes place in waters under States' jurisdiction (territorial sea, archipelagic waters, internal waters) and would otherwise fall outside the scope of international response to it.
Fourthly, what follows from the previous point, UN Security Council resolutions authorize 36 States and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to take "all necessary measures" for the purpose of suppressing these acts. This in essence means, in conjunction with the fact that these are "Chapter VII resolutions", that the fight with piracy and armed robbery can be undertaken also within the territorial sea of Somalia and may involve use of force. However, it needs to be underlined that the Security Council allowed this to happen only after it received an appropriate request from Transitional Federal Government ("TFG") of Somalia and the authorisation extends only to States for which advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the UN Secretary-General 37 . Furthermore, it shall be highlighted in this context that the UN Security Council, in its resolution 1851 (2008), extended the authorisation to take all necessary measures to apply also "in Somalia". Although it does not state it explicitly, it is commonly understood as allowing for antipiracy actions also within the Somali land territory 38 . Lastly, it is worthwhile to underline that they contain an interesting safeguard clause, where the Security Council:
"Affirms that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations, under the Convention, with respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been S/RES/2020 (2011) renewed only following the receipt of the 10 November 2011 letter conveying the consent of the TFG" 39 (emphasis in original).
This rather unprecedented clause is supposed to make sure that the authorisations contained in the above-cited UN Security Council resolutions (and/ It seems that Members of the Institute, while confirming that UNCLOS rules on piracy are also of customary character, recognize the restrictions of the definition of "piracy" of Article 101 of the Convention. This has led to the satisfaction of the Institute over the adoption by the UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008) discussed above, as it broadened and adapted "the scope of the existing international rules on piracy to include, in particular, acts against vessels committed in the territorial sea". However, it needs to be underlined that resolution 1816 (2008), just as other Security Council's "authorization resolutions" on piracy off the coast of Somalia, contained the above-discussed safeguard clause that indicated that it was not its intention to generally extend the scope of existing international rules on piracy.
Second, States of the region particularly affected by piracy off the coast of Somalia signed on 29. 43 Although it should be stressed that it is construed as a treaty, containing inter alia dispute settlement and depository clause. The language it uses is, however, not of is that the signatories of the Djibouti Code of Conduct: (a) agreed that international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea; (b) agreed also to the definition of "armed robbery". Again (similarly as in the ReCAAP case), this definition follows the definition of "piracy" of Article 101 UNCLOS (which is also transposed verbatim into the Code), however it relates to acts committed within State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea and it disposes of the "two ships criterion". The Djibouti Code of Conduct provides also for enhanced cooperation in the fields of exchanging of information (Article 2(a) of the Code; on the basis of Article 8 Information Sharing Centres were to be established) and combating piracy (and piracy only; Article 4 of the Code does not apply to "armed robbery"). Finally, signatories to the Djibouti Code of Conduct expressed their intent to review their legislation in order to, among others, "allow for the prosecution, conviction and punishment of those involved in piracy or armed robbery against ships, and to facilitate extradition or handing over when prosecution is not possible […]" (Article 11 of the Code).
Reference should also be made to the IMO Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy ("BMP 4") 44 -set of rules and best practices developed by the maritime industry that are intended to assist ships to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia. Encouraged by the UN Security Council 
Modern challenges related to the definition of piracy
It was already briefly noted above that although UNCLOS (Article 101) definition of "piracy" is well accepted in international law, it notwithstanding has certain inherent limitations. Firstly, it is restricted to acts committed "for private ends" 47 . Secondly, ratione loci, acts of piracy have to take place either on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any place 48 . Thirdly, it takes at least two ships (or aircrafts) to commit an act of piracy as it needs to be directed "against another ship or aircraft" 49 . These limitations will be discussed below.
Piracy committed "for private ends"
The phrase "committed for private ends" in the Convention's definition may be understood twofold. On the one hand, one can look into the subjective motives of the perpetrator to see whether his or her intentions are of private or public/political character. In other words, the test here would lie in qualifying the act as committed for "private" gain (e.g., robbery, revenge) as contrasted with public/political purpose encompassing, for instance, a situation where perpetrators want to compel a State to act in a certain manner (as was the case in e.g., Achille Lauro incident noted below).
On the other hand, the test could be objective in a sense that it is not the motive but the absence of State sanction that matters. If one accepts this view, it would mean that the motives of the perpetrator are irrelevant. What becomes decisive is whether piratical actions raise question of State immunity or engage State responsibility 50 . If a certain action lacks State authorisation/sanction, it can be characterized as committed "for private ends".
These difficulties may be illustrated by reference to three incidents. Firstly, in 1961 a Portuguese ship Santa Maria was seized in the high seas by some of its passengers, under the leadership of Captain Galvão, a Portuguese political dissident. He explained that it had been the first step "aimed at overthrowing the Dictator Salazar of Portugal" (as a part of a political controversy between Salazar and General Delgado). At the request of Portugal (the Government of Salazar) to capture Santa Maria, a number of States responded favourably and, interestingly, some of them explicitly defined the incident as piracy (USA, UK), and USA even qualified Galvão as insurgent In these two cases the "two ships criterion" is not met, so this incident could not be defined as piracy in any case 53 . For the sake of argument it is still interesting to note that if one accepts the subjective interpretation of the phrase "for private ends" they would not qualify as piracy, as the motive was political (especially in the second case where there was a real attempt at compelling a State to undertake certain action). The situation is somewhat more complex if one accepts the second reading of the phrase under discussion. In this alternative, it would be necessary to decide on the status of PLF/PLO 54 -especially as to whether these organisations could be qualified as "private" (thus allowing, putting other problems as to the definition of piracy aside, to qualify the incident as piratical attack) or, rather, public (especially as an insurrectional movement) 55 . Similarly, in the Santa Maria incident the comment, somewhat hastily made, of USA as regards the status of Galvão could have significant legal consequences, as to piratical nature of the incident.
Thirdly, in the case of Castle John v. NV Mabeco, the Belgian Court of Cassation held in 1986 that a Greenpeace vessel (in this case the perpetrators are undoubtedly entirely of "private" character) had committed piracy against an allegedly polluting Dutch vessel when it attacked it, because this act of violence was "in support of a personal point of view" and not political 56 . This was in response to the appellants argument that:
"action which impedes, threatens, prevents, or makes more difficult the discharge at sea of waste products which are harmful for the environment, taken with a view to alerting public opinion, cannot be considered as having been committed 'for private ends' [...]" Thus, the Court referred here rather to the objective notion of the phrase "for private ends". As it suggested, what could have changed the qualification of the acts in question was the fact that they were committed "in the interest of a State" or "to the detriment of a State". The first part of the argument is straightforward -since Greenpeace is neither 55 a State nor did it act in the interest/on behalf of one -its actions were "for private ends". The second is slightly different as it concentrates not on a status of perpetrators but rather on the question against whom the crime is committed. This last point will be further elaborated on in the context of maritime terrorism. In any case, it seems logical to assume that the subjective intent (solely) should not be decisive in determining whether a given act is piracy or not. Ultimately, it would be always very difficult to identify what was a "true" intention of a perpetrator. Not to mention a possibility of a "mixed" intention -i.e., acting with political motives but, at the same time, robbing a ship for private gain 59 . This logics is also supported in law. The Harvard Draft is quite explicit on that point in saying that:
"Although states at times have claimed the right to treat as pirates unrecognized insurgents against a foreign government who have pretended to exercise belligerent rights on the sea against neutral commerce, or privateers whose commissions violated the announced policy of the captor [...], it seems best to confine the common jurisdiction to offenders acting for private ends only. [ 63 Article 16 of the Harvard Draft, referred to in the quote from the commentary to Article 3, provides for a right of a State to protect its nationals, ships and commerce against interference on or over the high sea, when such measures are not based upon jurisdiction over piracy. As the commentary explains, it was thought that in instances when for example a revolutionary organization uses an armed ship to establish a blockade against foreign commerce, it is for the injured State to decide on potential actions it might want to take (and not for other States . Given these arguments it is possible to conclude that the phrase "for private ends" should be rather interpreted objectively. Its main purpose is to exclude from the definition of piracy: (a) acts of States (e.g., warships); (b) acts of public/political nature undertaken by or on behalf of a State (e.g., privateers); (c) acts of entities of quasi-public status (e.g., insurgency movements). As was stated above, it would be unreasonable to hold that political motives -at least if it would be enough for the individual to declare his motives as such -automatically take the crime outside the scope of the definition of piracy. This problem will be discussed once more below in the context of marine terrorism and its relationship with piracy.
However, it is important to underline that the mere private legal status of those who commit an alleged crime of piracy may not be entirely decisive 73 . After all, Article 101 of UNCLOS speaks both of acts committed by a "private ship" or a "private aircraft" 74 and at the same time underlines that the crime has to be committed "for private ends". If the latter phrase was to be understood only by reference to the status of those who commit the crime, the former phrase would be superfluous. Is it therefore the only object of the phrase "for private ends" to exclude acts by privateers and insurgents (or, broadly speaking, acts committed on behalf of a State 75 or by an entity having a quasi-public character)? In other words one can ask . 72 On the basis of the Virginia Commentary it seems correct to conclude that there was no major discussion during the III UN Conference on the Law of the Sea neither on the phrase "for private ends" itself, nor on the Maltese proposal to delete it. 73 Cf. I. Brownlie, op. cit., at pp. 229-230: "[a]cts must be committed for private ends. It follows that piracy cannot be committed by warships or other government ships, or government aircraft, expect where the crew 'has mutinied and taken control of that ship or aircraft". 74 For these reasons the discussion on the so called State piracy was, as a general rule, omitted in this paper. 75 For example nowadays, in the context of the so called "privatization of war", it would be possible to state that if a private military company commits -on behalf of the State that "hired" it -an act of violence at sea, this act would rather not qualify as piracy.
the question whether private ship/individuals can act "for public ends" and, thereby, be outside the scope of the definition of piracy in Article 101 UNCLOS? As was argued above, the presumption here should be in the negative. This was illustrated by the Castle John case where political motives of individuals are still to be considered in terms of their personal, private views and, consequently, those motives do not converse their actions into public ones. In a way, the phrase "for private ends" asks the question of who is responsible for (who is the ultimate "beneficiary" of) the action -a State/entity recognized in public international law or not. If the answer is that at the end of a particular action is a State -then it triggers the law of state responsibility and/or immunity (not piracy jure gentium). In such a situation, at least as a rule, State responsibility arises as between the wrongdoing and injured State and there is no question of universal jurisdiction 76 . It is also possible to look at the problem posed above from a different perspective, namely the one of the rationale of outlawing piracy. Naturally, the designation "hostis humani generis" comes first into mind. Piracy is criminalized because those who commit it are enemies of mankind. This point was already made by Judge Moore in his Dissenting Opinion to the (in)famous Lotus case: "(…) [a]nd as the scene of the pirate's operations is the high seas, which it is not the right or duty of any nation to police, he is denied the protection of the flag which he may carry, and is treated as an outlaw, as the enemy of all mankind -hostis humani generis -whom any nation may in the interest of all capture and punish" 77 (emphasis added).
However, one can point out that pirates are considered as enemies of all men only when it comes to the high seas (and presently also EEZ). If the same act is committed in the territorial waters of a given State, it does not constitute piracy. Perhaps, therefore, one should not attach too . This seems to be, at least nowadays, a proper justification for the criminalization of piracy. If so, then the phrase "for private ends" would encompass any act committed by a private ship (or aircraft) that endangers the freedom of navigation (thus, inter alia, the need of the "two ships criterion" discussed below) and is of such a character that any State or other "public" entity may not be held accountable for it 82 . These conclusions could be translated also into the context of Somali piracy. Most notably, an argument is sometimes being put forward that the true motive of Somali pirates is the protection of Somali waters against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities of certain fleets or against dumping by the developed world of radioactive and/or toxic material in these waters 83 . Based on the foregoing 78 As it is summarized in the Harvard Draft, at p. argumentation, one should conclude that such claims would, however, not constitute a proper defence against the accusation of piracy. Also, even if money paid as ransom to pirates is used afterwards to finance illegal or even terrorist activities, this would not preclude to term the initial seizing of a ship and taking it hostage as piratical in nature. What could matter, though, is the status of those who commit piracy off the coast of Somalia. Namely, one could ponder if they could be qualified as insurgents. This, however, seems rather doubtful and, at best, an unrecognized insurgency movement could come into play 84 . Although there are divergent views as to whether the phrase "for private ends" excludes acts committed only by recognized insurgency movements, it seems consensual that even accepting the exclusion of unrecognized ones, this applies only when their attacks are directed against one State only 85 . Since piracy off the coast of Somalia affects many third States, even theoretical exclusion of those attacks from the notion of piracy on the ground of "for private ends" argument, is not possible.
Piracy and terrorism
The proper interpretation of the phrase "for private ends" comes into play in one more important context -the one of terrorism 86 . This situation is particularly complex. 86 Naturally, this paper is interested not in every terrorist attack but only "marine" one -the one that takes place in the high seas (or EEZ) and involves using a ship.
perspective of international law, the concern has evolved rather around such elements of the definition of piracy as: whether there needs to be an animus furandi; whether actual theft or robbery need to take place; whether mutinied crew can be defined as piratical; or, finally, whether it is justified in law to classify insurgents as pirates. Terrorism, including marine terrorism, is a relatively new phenomenon which poses challenges to many fields of international law. In particular, it is unclear as to how (if at all) to differentiate between "terrorism" and "piracy". Are these terms mutually exclusive or perhaps the same act can be qualified as piratical and terrorist at the same time?
It is most often stated that since the phrase "for private ends" excludes political motives, then piracy is conceptually different than terrorism and, consequently, the latter does not fall into the scope of the definition of piracy in Article 101 UNCLOS 87 . In any case it is useful to see what terrorism, under international law, is. It should be underlined in that context that there is no agreed definition of "terrorism" in international law "(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when the act involves a transnational element" 89 . Also, since 1996 the work has been underway within the United Nations to draft a comprehensive convention on international terrorism ("CCIT") 90 . Even though this work is far from being completed (and it is doubtful whether it will be possible to garner enough international consensus for its conclusion, not least due to the problem of the definition of terrorism), it is useful to look at the most recent draft of the convention, where it is proposed in Article 2 that: 90 UNGA Resolution A/RES/51/210 of 17.12.1996, esp. at para 9, where it decided "to establish an Ad Hoc Committee, open to all States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing international instruments, and thereafter to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism".
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act"
(emphasis added).
For the purposes of the present paper it will suffice to draw two main conclusions from this brief characterization of terrorism. Firstly, it seems that when it comes to the nature of the act itself, as long as it is committed in the marine context, it may fulfill the criteria of both terrorism and piracy. An "illegal act of violence or detention" may encompass the above mentioned acts of terrorism. After all, terrorism has been labelled as "chameleon-like" since it "may fall under various categories of crimes, depending on the circumstances in which terrorist acts are perpetrated"
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. Thus, what becomes decisive for the present purposes, i.e., to differentiate between "terrorism" and "piracy", is the intent.
It seems that there is a consensus in international law that an act of terrorism is intended to compel a State to act in a certain manner and/or to intimidate the population. It is clear therefore that this intent may be defined as "political". It is equally clear that if one accepts the view that the phrase "for private ends" in Article 101 of UNCLOS is to be understood subjectively, terrorist acts will automatically fall outside of the Convention's definition of piracy. However, as was argued above, the test should rather be objective thus leaving the possibility that terrorism (as for example in the case of Achille Lauro, had other criteria of piracy been fulfilled) could at the same time constitute piracy.
This brings the discussion to another problem, namely, the one of terrorist acts committed by movements or organisations claiming the status of insurgents, the so-called "freedom fighters"
93
. As was already mentioned above, early debates on piracy focused inter alia on the need to exclude insurgents from the definition of piracy. There are two main arguments that can be made in that context. First, the reason for not treating insurgents as pirates lays in the fact that they have quasi-public status and act rather as belligerents than individuals for private ends. Additional problem in that context is how 91 to treat unrecognized insurgents. Diverse opinions were expressed in the literature on this subject 94 . D. P. O'Connell argued for example that the real line of demarcation is not the recognized versus unrecognized status of the insurgents but the quality of the acts alone 95 . In the Oppenheim's handbook, on the other hand, it is stated that:
"vessels of unrecognized insurgents interfering with ships of third states may be treated as piratical; when such attacks show criminal ruthlessness resulting in the loss of life, their crews may be subjected to the drastic penalties which international law reserves for pirates jure gentium"
(emphasis added).
This discussion, insofar as it concerns the recognized/unrecognized status of insurgents, cannot be easily translated into the context of terrorism. One may pose a question whether it is possible to speak, in the same sense as with the recognized insurgents, of a recognized terrorist organisation, thereby claiming it has a certain public international status; rights and obligations under international law. This problem, indeed, is one of the reasons why the internationally accepted definition of terrorism cannot be found. Some States claim that acts of violence perpetrated by "freedom fighters", exercising their right of self-determination, cannot be properly termed terrorist 97 . This, in turn, amounts to ipso facto recognition of their right to pursue their (political) aims by violent, terroristic methods. While the discussion on this issue within the UN is not over yet, it is still possible to point out that the General Assembly declared, inter alia, that: Hence, it may be inferred that neither terrorist organisations may be recognized as legitimate (in a way that insurgents can be), nor can they claim to have certain quasi-public status that would necessitate to treat them rather as belligerents acting for "public ends".
The second argument that was made pertains to the fact that insurgents may act only vis-à-vis a government of a State they want to overthrow. Thus, their actions would not be of a "hostis humani generis" character and would not constitute piracy. This problem was already reflected in the Oppenheim's handbook quotation above, where it is stated that actions of unrecognized insurgents trigger the laws of piracy only when they interfere with ships of third States. It would seem therefore that as long as their actions are directed against a particular State (or rather its ships) -not endangering the right of freedom of navigation of other States -such action would not be piratical. Even when one accepts that view 99 , it also does not seem appropriate to transpose that conclusion into the realm of terrorism. As was recognized by the UN General Assembly acts of terrorism "constitute a grave violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which may pose a threat to international peace and security". It is thus unconceivable to hold that only one State is affected by a terrorist activity and thereby only this State can undertake (or not) steps against individuals in question. One should bear in mind that for a terrorist act to qualify as piratical as well, all other (this is on the assumption that the phrase "for private ends", presently under consideration, does not exclude terrorism) criteria of the 98 definition of piracy in Article 101 of UNCLOS need to be fulfilled. Hence, the situation must, inter alia, take place in the high seas and action must be directed against another vessel. As was already argued before, accepting the view that the phrase "for private ends" excludes terrorism, would be tantamount to stating that "normally" such an action constitutes piracy but since in a given context it was a terrorist action against one State only, it takes it outside the scope of the definition of piracy. This view should be rejected.
One can argue here that international terrorism 100 is of such a character that it remains the concern of the whole international community of States (this point will be further elaborated on below). What should be decisive for its qualification as piratical is the fact that it endangers the right of freedom of navigation, as this is the rationale for outlawing piracy jure gentium. Given the methods and scale of terrorist attacks, it seems hardly plausible to fulfil the definition of terrorism and at the same time do not fulfill the criteria of piracy. This could take the form of a hostage-taking (similarly as in Achille Lauro) or kidnapping a ship (especially the one carrying oil or gas) in order to sail it into another (e.g., passenger) ship in the high seas 101 . Such an action may be intended to have "political" effects and be directed against a State or group of States. It does not prevent one from seeing it as piratical as well. To borrow the logics from the Castle John case, the fact the certain individuals hold private views on political/public matters and want to achieve political/public aims, does not mean that their acts are not for "private ends". These are, after all, their private views and their private ends. The situation would be different when one could prove, that the aim was indeed public -for example the action was sponsored or at least tolerated by a government. This would indeed take it outside the scope of piracy 102 . 100 So called "domestic terrorism" -committed in the territory of a State and against it -is outside the scope of this analysis. Reassuming, it is possible to conclude that terrorist attack is not prevented from being qualified as piratical. The phrase "for private ends" shall be understood objectively and as long as the attack in question was not authorised in any way by a State, it could fall within the scope of piracy, as provided for in Article 101 of UNCLOS.
At this point it is useful to remind that the SUA Convention was negotiated mainly in response to legal (and practical) challenges that the Achille Lauro incident posed to the international law, including law of piracy. As was noticed earlier, the SUA Convention does not contain the proviso "for private ends", nor the "two ships criterion". It seems therefore well suited to be applied in the context of terrorist marine activities 103 . Up to date, however, States have not made use of that legal instrument for this purposes.
Territorial scope of the definition of piracy:
"piracy" and "armed robbery"
Consequently, by virtue of this provision, acts committed in the EEZ may also constitute piracy within the meaning of Article 101 UNCLOS. Formally speaking, this conclusion has to be qualified that regulations concerning piracy in the high seas apply in the EEZ only as long as they are not incompatible with Part V of the Convention (devoted to EEZ). It is therefore safe to conclude that piracy can be committed both in the high seas and in the EEZ. A contrario, acts committed in the territorial sea, archipelagic waters or internal waters cannot be termed "piracy" and, consequently, thirds States do not enjoy rights enumerated in Article 103 UNCLOS. There are, however, certain legal and practical difficulties pertaining to that issue, which may be illustrated be the table 1.
These figures, taken from the IMO reports on "Piracy and armed robbery", show that there has been a significant number of attacks that were conducted not in the high seas but in territorial sea or port area. Consequently, they do not fulfil the "piracy" criteria prescribed in Article 101 of UNCLOS. It is for that reason that in the IMO context a phrase "piracy and armed robbery" is used. The "armed robbery" part is supposed to cover situations where acts are "piratical" in nature though due to the maritime area they were committed in, they do not constitute piracy proper. As it was already noted, IMO frequently uses the term "armed robbery"
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. Interestingly, the term is increasingly used in the legal context. ReCAAP contains (the only legally binding) definition of "armed robbery". Also, Djibouti Code of Conduct, in similar terms, defines it. Lastly, the term is frequently used both in the UN Security Council resolutions on piracy off the coast of Somalia, as well as by the UN General Assembly in the "Oceans and the law of the sea" resolutions. It would be nevertheless too premature to speak of any customary international law 109 definition 108 In the IMO context it is defined in the, non-legally binding, Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (resolution A.1025(26), Annex, paragraph 2.2), as follows:
" 'Armed robbery against ships' means any of the following acts: (a) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea; (b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above. of armed robbery. The practice of States in that regard does not seem to be widespread and consistent enough. Moreover, the mere usage of the term "armed robbery" does not indicate that there exists opinio iuris as to its content and legally binding force.
In shall be also underlined in this context that there is a fundamental difference between high seas/EEZ and territorial sea/internal waters. The later marine areas are within the scope of the coastal State sovereignty which exercises jurisdiction over them and acts committed therein. One cannot draw simple analogy that since "piracy" and "armed robbery" are often used together there are similar sets of legal rules that apply when these crimes are committed. Just on the contrary. Piracy (proper) -seen from the perspective of the structure of UNCLOS -is a crime towards internationally recognized right of freedom of navigation in areas outside of sovereign jurisdiction of a coastal State . Secondly, and decisively, these are areas to which the sovereignty of a coastal State extends. Permitting thirds States to repress piracy, seize ships and even exercise their jurisdiction over the seized pirates in territorial sea/archipelagic waters would equal to a severe limitation of coastal State sovereignty. Therefore, criminal acts in these marine areas are considered rather as injurious to the coastal State and therefore left to its jurisdiction. As it is stated in the ILC commentary to the 1956 Draft Articles: Hence, it shall be concluded that: (a) the definition of piracy does not apply to acts committed in territorial sea/archipelagic waters; (b) there is a growing tendency to use the term "armed robbery" to denote "piracy" (though certain differences in the definition of these terms exist) but committed in above mentioned marine areas; (c) similarity in the "criminal nature" in these two instances of maritime offence does not extend to similar legal consequences (including rights and obligations of States) flowing from their breach.
As was already mentioned, Article 101 of UNCLOS contains also second "territorial limitation" to the definition of piracy, namely, it mentions "places outside the jurisdiction of any State"
114 . The ILC Commentary to 1956 Draft Articles explains that the intention here was to include in the definition acts committed on an island constituting terra nullius or on the shores of an unoccupied territory 115 . Thus, this provision is of rather limited use presently (for the apparent lack of res nulliae), however, it might be argued that it could encompass piracy, if any, off the coast of Antarctica.
The "two ships criterion"
Yet another problem relating to the definition of piracy is the one sometimes referred to as the "two ships criterion". It derives from the formulation that piracy has to be committed "against another ship" on the high seas 116 . What is therefore left outside of this definition is for example a mutiny or other acts of violence -such as the ones exemplified in the above mentioned Achille Lauro or Santa Maria incidents. In other words, this problem refers to situations where acts of violence, detention or depredation are committed by crew or passengers of the ship against this very ship or its crew/passengers (also known as: internal taking). This was a deliberate attempt by the ILC, as it is remarked in its commentary to the 1956 Draft Articles, although it was aware of the differences in opinion on that point 117 . This approach was taken in line with what was suggested in the Harvard Draft 118 and should be assessed positively. As was explained above, the "logics" of the crime of piracy stems mainly from the fact that it endangers international shipping and, thus, is an object of concern of all States
119
. A ship that, for whatever reason, was taken over by criminals -and does not interfere with other ships -falls short, and rightly so, of the definition of piracy. Instead, depending of the nature of the crime, such acts may fall into one or many other categories of crimes -either national (e.g., under the law of the flag State, if the ship may still be considered as flying the flag of that State) or international (e.g., UN Hostages Convention or SUA Convention). Naturally, such a ship, following its criminal conduct afterwards, may turn into a "pirate ship" in the meaning of Articles 101 and 103 of UNCLOS. This point deserves one additional comment. The definition contained in Article 103 of UNCLOS states in its relevant part that: "A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101" (emphasis added). 117 'Yearbook of the International Law Commission' 1956, Vol. II, at p. 282: "Acts committed on board a ship by the crew or passengers and directed against the ship itself, or against persons or property on the ship, cannot be regarded as acts of piracy". Cf. R. Jennings, A. Watts, op. cit., at p. 747, where it is noted that previous editions of the Oppenheim's manual contained a very broad definition of piracy that encompassed mutiny. This definition was abandoned though, as it was thought that nowadays piracy jure gentium is expressed in the Convention on the high seas and UNCLOS.
118 'Yearbook of the International Law Commission' 1955, Vol. I, at pp. 41-42. 119 Alternatively, one can search for rationale of criminalizing of piracy in the fact that pirates are "hostes humani generis". See also on that point D. Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction..., at p. 28 where the Author speaks of theoretical justifications of the prohibition of piracy and is of the opinion that currently the justification is to be found rather in the protection of freedom of navigation than in the fact that pirates are "enemies of mankind". Cf. D.P. O'Connell, op. cit., Vol. II, at pp. 968-969.
What is therefore interesting is that for a ship to become a pirate one, it would be enough that the persons who conducted the internal taking intended to commit an act of piracy, as described in Article 101 of UNCLOS. In other words, it would be possible to define a ship as piratical even when the act of piracy itself was not committed (but "merely" intended) 120 . What is more, this would be also enough to trigger the application of Article 105 of UNCLOS which allows, inter alia, to seize a "pirate ship" on the high seas.
Another problem that relates to the "two ships criterion" is not of quantitative but of qualitative character. Namely, one needs two ships to commit a crime. However, in the Somali context the piratical attacks take place from "skiffs". As the methodology of Somali pirates was explained:
"Initially pirate attacks were launched from beach heads in open 20' long skiffs, with high free boards and powered by 75 to 85 horse power outboard motors whose range and safety was dictated by the state of the sea, amount of fuel on board and engine power. The most highly regarded outboard motor along the east coast is the Yamaha 85 horsepower outboard motor. This allows a skiff to attain speed of 30 knots in relatively calm seas with four people aboard. More recent reports indicate that these skiffs are now being powered by as much as two 150 hp motors. These skiffs move about looking for slow moving vulnerable commercial or fishing vessels ideally travelling under 15 knots with a low freeboard" 121 .
Later, the practice of pirates has changed and involved the use of "mother ships":
"The pirates began to use 'mother ships', larger ships or dhows already pirated that could move inconspicuously into the ocean carrying pirates weapons and skiffs. When a targeted ship was spotted the skiffs were released close by and raced towards the targeted ship with pirates armed with automatic weapons and RPG's" 122 .
It is therefore appropriate to ask, whether "skiffs" can be considered as "ships" in the meaning of international law of the sea and, consequently, do they fall within the scope of the "piracy" definition in Article 101 of UNCLOS. One could note at the outset that UNCLOS contains no definition of a ship 123 (and, moreover, it also uses the term "vessel" -not defined as well). Such a definition may be found in various agreements, notably those concluded under the auspices of IMO, however their content depends on the issue a given agreement is devoted to 124 . Given the purpose-oriented definitions adopted in various treaties, also the original attempt by Special Rapporteur J.P.A. François to include the definition of the ship in the ILC Draft Articles, failed altogether 125 . Hence, it would be impossible to find a universal definition of a ship in the field of, broadly speaking, international law of the sea 126 . Nevertheless, one should assume that a ship within the meaning of Article 101 of UNCLOS is broad enough to include "skiffs". The object and purpose 127 of the Convention's rules on piracy would be defeated if the mere usage by pirates of a non-standard vehicle would make them immune to the crime of piracy. Additionally, the subsequent practice of States 128 "another ship"). Since this provision uses different formulation than the preceding paragraph of the Convention, it could mean that it shall be interpreted differently and, consequently, the phrase "a ship" may include internal taking of a ship by pirates. Opinions in the doctrine vary on that point 130 . It is proposed here that -notwithstanding the unfortunate different formulations in Article 101(1)(i) and (ii) -internal taking, even in areas outside the jurisdiction of any State, should not constitute piracy. As explained above, a rationale for outlawing piracy is that it presents a danger for the right of freedom of navigation on high seas. There is no reason to change that logics when it comes to areas outside the jurisdiction of any State (which could presently refer only to Antarctica) 131 . The ILC's rationale behind (current) Article 101(1)(ii) of UNCLOS was to broaden the territorial scope of areas where piracy could be committed but not to change the definition when it comes to how it could be committed.
conclusions
As this paper purported to show, the crime of piracy has its established definition, both in treaty and customary international law. It has been adopted in some agreements and/or non binding documents well after 1982 (when the III UN Conference on the Law of the Sea concluded its work). Nevertheless, this established definition continues to pose some legal and practical challenges to the modern fight against piracy.
First, these problems relate to the fact that "piracy" jure gentium cannot be committed in the territorial sea/internal waters. Since this question involves also problems that are related to the sovereignty of a coastal State, the answer to the challenge is twofold. On the one hand, there is a growing tendency to refer to "armed robbery" (that is, however, defined slightly different than piracy) and, on the other, the consent of 130 The ILC commentary explains that the general intention was, still, to exclude internal taking. ' a coastal State and/or UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of UN Charter needs to be in place as well. The coexistence of the terms "piracy" and "armed robbery" in the modern discussion in international law shall not, however, lead to their analogous treatment when it comes to their legal status and consequences of committing them. Second, the phrase "for private ends" in the definition of piracy as reflected in Article 101 of UNCLOS shall not be interpreted subjectively. Consequently, declarations of a perpetrator that the crime was committed for political ends does not automatically exclude it from the scope of piracy provisions. Similarly, terrorist acts may at the same time be qualified as piratical. In that last instance, however, it may be the case that it will be better for a given State to base its action on the SUA Convention. UNCLOS piracy provisions should be rather of subsidiary character in that context.
Lastly, in order to qualify as piratical a given act needs to be committed against another ship. This requirement does not prevent attacks that are conducted on "skiffs" off the coast of Somalia from being defined as piracy. On the other hand, the internal taking of a ship is excluded from this definition. Here, again, SUA Convention could provide a legal basis to criminalize and prosecute such acts (although without calling them "piracy").
